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During the 1998 party conference The Sun famously pronounced the Conservative Party 
dead. As a Hague-faced parrot swung from its perch, the accompanying headline read: µThis 
party is no more ... it has ceased to be ... this is an ex-SDUW\¶7KHSDSHUGLDJQRVHGWKHFDXVH
RI GHDWK µVXLFLGH¶ $V WKings turned out, contra the original Monty Python sketch, the 
Conservative Party was not totally expired ± it had not ceased to be, although it had slipped 
into a very deep slumber. After the trauma of landslide electoral defeat in 1997 a preference 
for closing its eyes to the enormous scale of the task of rebuilding its electoral appeal could 
perhaps be forgiven. No such excuse could be advanced following the deafening wake-up call 
sounded by the 2001 general election. µ/DERXU¶VVHFRQGODQGVOLGH¶SURGXFHGanother defeat of 
VLPLODU VWDWLVWLFDO PDJQLWXGH DUJXDEO\ WKH ZRUVW UHVXOW LQ WKH &RQVHUYDWLYH 3DUW\¶V KLVWRU\
(Geddes and Tonge, 2001; Tyrie, 2001: 3). If any acclaim can be attributed to the Hague 
years it is that the doomsday scenario of further losses was averted. Although it remained on 
life-support, the Conservative Party had at least avoided the fate of the Liberal party and 
inexorable decline to third party status ± political death in a first-past-the-post electoral 
system. But on almost any measure UHSUHVHQWHGWKHQDGLURIWKH&RQVHUYDWLYHV¶WUDYDLOV
In terms of seats the Conservatives made a nominal advance of one, although not at the 
expense of any other party (they regained Tatton, the seat vacated by the independent MP 
Martin Bell). The performance in terms of votes was little better. At the 2001 election, the 
Conservatives received 8.35 million votes, over 1.25 million fewer than in 1997. On a 
VXEVWDQWLDOO\UHGXFHGWXUQRXWWKHSDUW\¶VVKDUHRIWKHYRWHDGYDQFHGE\RQHSHUFHQWEXWWKH
polls suggested that a higher turnout would have worked against them (Butler and Kavanagh, 
2002: 251-264; Tyrie, 2001: 5).  
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The crisis facing the Conservatives in 2001 was also more than an electoral one. It was a 
crisis of ideology, mission and narrative. As Tim Bale (2010) has argued, under the 
leadership of William Hague short-term tactics prevailed over any coherent conception of a 
long-term strategy. The Conservatives under Hague failed to communicate a convincing 
narrative explaining to the electorate what conservatism was for. In substantial part this 
reflected a failure of leadership, but more fundamentally it also stemmed from a long-term 
ideological crisis about the very nature of post-Thatcherite conservatism (Hayton, 2012; 
Gamble, 1995). One manifestation of this was the sense of ambiguity surrounding 
Conservative attempts to articulate one of their most traditional themes and pillar of their 
electoral support: a clear sense of nationhood. The 1997 election reduced the Conservatives 
to a rump of 165 MPs largely in the south and east of England, with no representation in 
Scotland or Wales.1 In spite of this status as the de facto English party the Conservatives 
remained wedded to a traditional idea of Britain ± DV:HOOLQJVKDVDUJXHGµWKH 
historical merging of Englishness and Britishness continued to operate, leaving English 
nationalism without coherence¶However, in the evolving context of devolution to Scotland 
and Wales and the broader cultural trend of the emergence of a stronger felt and more clearly 
defined sense of English identity (Hayton et al. 2009) the Conservatives were left without a 
clear conception of nationhood which they could communicate effectively to the electorate.  
 
This difficulty wDV V\PSWRPDWLF RI WKH &RQVHUYDWLYH 3DUW\¶V SUREOHPV EHWZHHQ  DQG
2001. Unsure of its own purpose, and facing a centrist New Labour government in its 
ascendency, the Conservative Party under Hague was unable to fashion a convincing 
response to the questLRQ µZK\ YRWH &RQVHUYDWLYH"¶ DQG IHOO EDFN RQ D FRUH-vote strategy 
lacking widespread appeal. )ROORZLQJ +DJXH¶s resignation the Conservatives needed to 
identify a leader capable of formulating and conveying an answer to that question which 
would invigorate the party and enthuse the electorate. $V3HWHU6QRZGRQODWHUFRPPHQWHGµIf 
ever there was a time for an inspired leader to lift the Tories out of thHJORRPLWZDVQRZ¶
(2010: 75). Who would answer the call for the Conservatives in their hour of need?  
 
At the outset the odds-on favourite with the bookmakers was Michael Portillo, although it 
ZDVµQRWHQWLUHO\FHUWDLQWKDWKHZRXOGHYHQHQWHUWKHFRQWHVW¶Alderman and Carter, 2002: 
                                                 
1
 They did little better in 2001, winning one seat in Scotland and none in Wales.  
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572). Portillo was one of only two men (the other being the former Chancellor, Kenneth 
Clarke) widely assumed capable of returning the Conservatives to power. Portillo had, 
however, caused substantial unease amongst former admirers on the right of the party who 
VKDUHGZLWK7KDWFKHU WKHYLHZ WKDWKH µKDG ³ORVWKLVZD\´ VLQFHKLV FRQYHUVLRQ WR ³WRXFK\
IHHO\´ &RQVHUYDWLVP¶ :DOWHUV   )RU WKH 7KDWFKHULWHV 3RUWLOOR¶V SHUVRQDO DQG
political journey to an agenda of social liberalism and uncompromising modernisation was 
less a voyage of discovery and more the confused wanderings of a prodigal son yet to realise 
the error of his ways and return to the comforts of their ideological home. Had he been 
willing to compromise and sound a dog-whistle or two he would in all likelihood have made 
it to the final ballot of party members. Keen to secure a mandate firmly on his own terms he 
was unwilling to do so, and was eliminated by one vote (Hayton and Heppell, 2010: 428). As 
analysis by Heppell and Hill demonstrated, 3RUWLOOR¶V inability to capture the votHVRI µpure 
Thatcherites¶ SURYHG IDWDO WR KLV FKDQFHV µit was their abandonment of Portillo that was 
critical to his elimination and the eventual election of Duncan Smith as party leader¶
50). One Portillo supporter, John Bercow, suggested that the result could be easily 
understood: µIRU.HQ¶V(XURSKLOLD VXEVWLWXWH0LFKDHO¶VVRFLDOO\OLEHUDOFUHGHQWLDOV¶)RUKLP
3RUWLOORµZDVFOHDUO\WKHPRGHUQLVLQJFDQGLGDWHLQ¶EXWWKHSDUW\µZDVQ¶WUHDG\IRUDQG
ZDVQ¶W VLJQHG-up to the idea that it needed IXQGDPHQWDOO\ WRFKDQJH LWV DSSURDFK¶ %HUFRZ
Interview).  
 
In short, Iain Duncan Smith¶V HOHFWLRQ DV &RQVHUYDWLYH 3DUW\ OHDGHU was less a positive 
endorsement of either the man or his message, and more to do with who he was not and what 
he did not represent. In the final parliamentary ballot he received less than a third of the votes 
available (54 out of 166 MPs supported him). Nonetheless Duncan Smith did achieve a clear 
victory over Clarke in the ballot of party members, securing 61 percent of the vote on a 
WXUQRXW RI  SHUFHQW +RZHYHU DV 'HQKDP DQG 2¶+DUD KDYH KLJKOLJKWHG WKH SDUW\
membership who ultimately selected the leader would have no say about his removal: the 
µ+DJXHUXOHV¶PHDQWWKDWMXVW03VFRXOGIRUFHDYRWHRIFRQILGHQFHZLWKRXWHYHQthe need 
to nominate an alternative candidate (2008: 66). Right from the off, his position as leader 
µVHHPHGSUHFDULRXV¶ibid.) ± but what, if anything, could he do to enhance his authority and 
secure it?  
 
In his seminal OHFWXUH µ3ROLWLFVDVD9RFDWLRQ¶ WKH VRFLRORJLVW0D[:HEHU (1918) identified 
three mainstays of legitimate rule: traditional authority; charismatic authority; and formal 
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and/or legal authority derived from holding office. If a custom of deferential obedience was 
HYHU HQMR\HG E\ 'XQFDQ 6PLWK¶V SUHGHFHVVRUV LW SUREDEO\ died with the µmagic circle¶ ± 
democratising the leadership selection procedure formalised the existing actuality that 
incumbents are ultimately beholden to the parliamentary party. The second source Weber 
noted, charisma ± LQ KLV ZRUGV µa certain quality of an individual personality, by virtue of 
which he is set apart from ordinary men¶ ± is perhaps more important than ever for the 
modern politician. But not HYHQ'XQFDQ6PLWK¶VPRVWOR\DOOLHXWenants would have suggested 
he was a man of flair with the ability to inspire a devoted following, and his own depiction of 
KLPVHOIDV WKH µTXLHWPDQ¶ZDVD WDFLW DFNQRZOHGJPHQWRI this fact. Consequently, Duncan 
Smith needed to establish his authority through an astute management of the capacities 
available to him through his position as party leader, to reassure doubtful colleagues that he 
ZDVLQGHHGµXSWRWKHMRE¶. As noted elsewhere, µhaving commenced his party leadership with 
a disputed mandate it was essential that Duncan Smith provided the following: first, a viable 
programme of policy renewal and strategic reorientation; and second, internal unity and 
effective political leadership¶ (Hayton and Heppell, 2010: 429). 
 
Public communication 
 
Iain Duncan Smith was an ineffectual public communicator. As leader of the opposition he 
had three main audiences to address: the Parliamentary Conservative Party (PCP), the wider 
party (i.e. the membership), and the electorate. In each case he failed to connect successfully, 
making little impact with the general public and losing the confidence of his parliamentary 
colleagues and, eventually, the party members whose votes had installed him as leader.  
 
Defeated leadership contender Michael Portillo commented that DunFDQ6PLWKµZDVQ¶WDEOH
to perform at the necessary level, so he was desperately undermined by that, and that 
KDSSHQHGSUHWW\PXFKDWRQFH¶3RUWLOOR,QWHUYLHZ,QWHUPVRIWKHSDUOLDPHQWDU\SDUW\WKLV
LQDELOLW\ ZDV UDSLGO\ H[SRVHG E\ 'XQFDQ 6PLWK¶V SHUIormances at the despatch box of the 
House of Commons. For any party leader a key opportunity to rally the troops when the 
KRXVHZDVVLWWLQJZDVSUHVHQWHGZHHNO\DW3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶V4XHVWLRQ7LPH$UPHGZLWKVL[
questions, the leader of the opposition has the chance to expose the Prime Minister to 
VXVWDLQHG SUHVVXUH DQG VFUXWLQ\ 'XQFDQ 6PLWK¶V Harly performances were measured and 
overshadowed by international events. The announcement of his accession, originally 
scheduled for 12th September 2001, was delayed by 24 hours as a mark of respect following 
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the terrorist attacks the previous day. In the aftermath of the 9/11 atrocities Tony Blair 
bestrode the world stage, and there was little for Duncan Smith to do other than offer his 
VXSSRUW WR WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V VWDWHG GHWHUPLQDWLRQ WR VWDQG µVKRXOGHU WR VKRXOGHU¶ ZLWK WKH
United States LQ WKH µZDU RQ WHUURU¶. $V *HRIIUH\ :KHDWFURIW ODWHU FRPPHQWHG DV µ%ODLU
SOD\HGWKHQHZ&KXUFKLOO«'XQFDQ6PLWKFRXOGRQO\WUDLOLQKLVZDNHDVKHLQHIIHFWXDOO\GLG
for months to FRPH¶  
 
Duncan Smith was perhaps also unfortunate that he his immediate predecessor William 
Hague, for all his other weaknesses as Conservative Party leader, was universally recognised 
as one of the most effective parliamentary performers of his generation, and a master of the 
quick fire cut and thrust of PMQs. Unfavourable comparisons were inevitable, one of the 
SROLWHURQHVEHLQJ WKDW'XQFDQ6PLWKZDV µ+DJXHZLWKRXW WKH MRNHV¶ :DOWHUV 
Perhaps partly in recognition of his own limitations as a debater, Duncan Smith consciously 
chose to adopt a less confrontational style than his predecessor, and determinedly stuck to 
topics which he supposed the public would like him to concentrate on, particularly the public 
VHUYLFHV7KLVKHOSHGWRUHLQIRUFHLQHIIRUWVWRUHIRFXVWKH&RQVHUYDWLYHV¶SROLF\DJHQGDVHH
below) but made little impression either within or beyond the Westminster village. As the 
months passed the rumbles of discontent on the Conservative backbenches grew, and the 
party leader was taunted in the House over his persistent nervous habit of clearing his throat ± 
pitilessly satirised in Private Eye as Iain Duncan Cough.  
 
Even as he struggled to satisfy the demands of his colleagues in the Commons, the wider 
SDUW\PHPEHUVKLSRXJKWWRKDYHEHHQ'XQFDQ6PLWK¶VQDWXUDOFRQVWLWXHQF\,GHRORJLFDOO\KH
was certainly one of them, an uncompromising Euro-sceptic with traditionalist views on 
social and moral matters. In the past he had voted in favour of both hanging and caning, and 
was, as one Telegraph ZULWHU REVHUYHG µD ELW V¶ :KHDWFURIW   In his 
hardworking campaign for the leadership he had also impressed members with solid 
performances at meetings up and down the country. Once elected however, the most 
important platform for addressing the party membership was the party conference. Through 
guaranteed media coverage conference also provides an opportunity to communicate to the 
electorate at large.  
 
Barely a month after assXPLQJWKHOHDGHUVKLS'XQFDQ6PLWK¶VILUVWFRQIHUHQFHZDVLQHYLWDEO\
overshadowed by the storm clouds of war gathering over Afghanistan, already subject to 
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aerial bombardment and about to face invasion from the American-led mission to overthrow 
the Taliban. His speech was in large part dedicated to September 11th and its consequences, 
DOWKRXJKPXFKRIWKHUHPDLQGHUZDVDQHIIRUWWRUHIRFXVWKH&RQVHUYDWLYHV¶DWWHQWLRQRQWKH
public services. The Daily Telegraph OR\DOO\UHSRUWHG'XQFDQ6PLWK¶VSOedge to 
put public services first, although even through the eyes of their sycophantic leader writer ±
who GLVFHUQHG D YLVLRQ µDW RQFH PRUH FRKHUHQW PRUH RULJLQDO DQG PRUH SURPLVLQJ WKDQ
DQ\WKLQJ WKH 7RULHV KDYH PDQDJHG VLQFH WKH V¶ ± as he took the stage he appeared 
µPRPHQWDULO\ EHPXVHG¶ and µEHJDQ QHUYRXVO\¶ The late Hugo Young similarly perceived 
WKDWµKHVHHPHGHPEDUUDVVHGWREHVWULGHWKHSODWIRUP¶DQGµGRHVQ
WKDYHDVKUHGRIH[FLWHPHQW
DERXWKLP¶DQGMXGJHGWKDWµ2QO\WKHPRVWGHVSHUDWH7RU\DFRlytes could grace a speech of 
such stupefying dullness with acclaim for its fantastic strategic significance, merely because 
LWFRPPLWWHGWKHSDUW\WRWDNHVWDWHVFKRROVDQGKRVSLWDOVVHULRXVO\¶<RXQJ 
 
The 2002 party conference is best remembered for the pronouncement by the then Chairman 
7KHUHVD0D\WKDWWKH&RQVHUYDWLYHVQHHGHGWRZRUNWRVKHGWKHLULPDJHDVµWKHQDVW\SDUW\¶
,WDOVRIHDWXUHGSUREDEO\WKHPRVWPHPRUDEOHSKUDVHRI'XQFDQ6PLWK¶VOHDGHUVKLSZKHQKH
XUJHGKLVSDUW\µ'RQRWXQGHUHVWLPDWHWKHGHWHUPLQDWLRQRIDTXLHWPDQ¶This undisguised 
effort to make virtue out of necessity was a direct acknowledgment of his own shortcomings 
as an orator, and it might have worked, had he been able to convincingly demonstrate his 
attributes as a leader in other ways. He could not, and when he returned to the theme the 
following year ± announcing in a toe-FXUOLQJWRQHWKDWµWKHTXLHWPDQLVKHUHWRVWD\DQGKH¶V
WXUQLQJXSWKHYROXPH¶± he found that it was a noise that few even in his own party wanted 
to hear. His foray into modernisation over, Duncan Smith pressed all the traditionalist buttons 
he hoped would appeal to his core constituency in the party membership. Simon Hoggart 
REVHUYHGWKDWLWZDVµURDGUDJHSROLWLFV¶; while in the opinion of another commentator: 
µ'XQFDQ 6PLWK NQRFNHG EDFN KLV RSSRQHQWV E\ SOD\LQJ WR HYHU\ ELJRWHG ERQH LQ WKH 7RU\
ERG\SROLWLF¶DQGµIOXQNHG¶WKHUHDOFKDOOHQJHZKLFKZDVµWRJHWFKHHUVIRUWKHQHZIDFHWKH
party needs to show if it is to crawl back towardVSRZHU¶(Glover, 2003). 
 
For the modern politician the most important forum for communicating with the electorate is 
the news media. Television, radio, newspapers and increasingly the internet provide space for 
political leaders to project their message to the public, albeit in most cases without any 
assurances as to how it will be filtered and presented. Unfortunately for him, Duncan Smith 
proved similarly ineffective as a media performer as he was in the House of Commons and on 
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the conference platform. Through his efforts to deveORS WKH ODQJXDJH RI µFRPSDVVLRQDWH
FRQVHUYDWLVP¶ DQGKLVVWDWHGGHVLUHWRµFKDPSLRQWKHYXOQHUDEOH¶'XQFDQ6PLWKGHPRQVWUDWHG
an appreciation of the need to tackle one of the major electoral problems that the 
Conservative Party faced ± namely its nasty party image. However, his poor communication 
skills greatly hindered him in this task, and he made little progress ± on most measures 
Conservative Party image data remained stubbornly negative (Hayton, 2012: 51-4).  
 
As Richard Heffernan has argued, the media LV DQ LPSRUWDQW OHDGHUVKLS UHVRXUFH µEXW LW LV
RQO\ RQH UHVRXUFH DPRQJVW PDQ\¶ $V KH VXJJHVWV PHGLD DWWHQWLRQ DQG HYHQ PHGLD
management by spin doctors, is of little use to a leader who lacks other key skills and 
DWWULEXWHV +HIIHUQDQ QRWHV µ7KH VWDUk reality is that while media image can help boost a 
SULPHPLQLVWHU¶VSXEOLFVWDQGLQJWKDWSXEOLFVWDQGLQJZLOOLQHYLWDEO\WUXPSWKDWPHGLDLPDJH¶
(2006: 598). The same is true for leaders of the opposition. The media served to expose 
Duncan Smith¶Vlack of aptitude as a communicator and his other shortcomings as a leader. 
$V 6QRZGRQ VXJJHVWV KH µfailed to get his message across because he failed to present it 
imaginatively and convincingly¶ (Snowdon, 2010: 93-4). This failure extended to each of the 
leadHU¶VNH\FRQVWLWXHQFLHVWKHHOHFWRUDWHWKHSDUW\PHPEHUVKLSEDFNEHQFKHUVDQGHYHQNH\
figures in his shadow cabinet. Whatever the merits of his message it was poorly conveyed, 
inconsistently presented, and largely ignored.  
 
Public policy platform 
 
Despite his reputation as a traditionalist hardliner, Duncan Smith showed signs of having 
heeded some of the lessons of defeat. Within weeks of being elected leader, he expressed his 
desire to re-HVWDEOLVK WKH &RQVHUYDWLYH 3DUW\ DV µWKH SDUW\ RI LGHDV¶ E\ launching a policy 
review (Seldon and Snowdon, 2005: 259). Duncan Smith also sought to orchestrate a 
concerted effort by the Conservatives to reposition themselves as a party of the public 
services, an agenda that would outlive his leadership and be taken into the 2005 general 
election and beyond. Members of the shadow cabinet made speeches and wrote articles on 
the subject of schools, hospitals and crime consistently over the four years following his 
election. Oliver Letwin, for example, made a series of sSHHFKHVRQWKHµ1HLJKERXUO\6RFLHW\¶
a thoughtful form of conservatism that sought to go beyond free markets (Letwin, 2003). The 
process of policy renewal made progress under Duncan Smith, and his record in this regard 
compares favourably to that of his predecessor (Seldon and Snowdon, 2005: 259-62). By 
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realigning WKH&RQVHUYDWLYHV¶policy priorities Duncan Smith hoped to bring about a strategic 
reorientation of the party, so that it was once again seen to be speaking to issues of public 
concern and reoccupying the political centre ground dominated by New Labour. He recalled 
WKDWµ,KDGDVHQVHWKDWWKHSXEOLFQHHGHGWRLQVWLQFWLYHO\EHJLQWRUH-identify with the party 
that they felt cared about what they did ± DELJFKDOOHQJH¶'XQFDQ6PLWK,QWerview).  
 
He used his first anniversary as party leader to declare publicly his desire WRGHIHDWµWKHILYH
JLDQWV¶ blighting %ULWDLQ¶V SRRUHVW FRPPXQLWLHV 7KH WDUJHWV KH VHOHFWHG ± µIDLOLQJ VFKRROV
crime, substandard healthcare, child poverty, and insecXULW\LQROGDJH¶± were less instructive 
than the language he chose to employ, which deliberately echoed that of the Beveridge 
Report (Duncan Smith, 2002; Seldon and Snowdon, 2005: 260-1). The aim of this was not to 
win votes for the Conservative Party in the most deprived areas of Britain, rather Duncan 
6PLWKEHOLHYHGWKDWµWe needed to broaden the party out, stretch the elastic out a bit. And 
that meant going further aQG GHHSHU WKDQ ZH¶G EHHQ EHIRUH¶ (Duncan Smith Interview). 
Arguably, only a figure from the right such as Duncan Smith could pursue such a strategy, as 
it drew criticism from that wing of the party (Cowley and Green, 2005: 52). As one early 
assessment of his leadership speculated, 'XQFDQ 6PLWK¶V µwillingness to question some 
longstanding party totems suggests that the right-wing credentials that secured his election 
may yet enable him to institute a transformation of the Conservative Party, just as Neil 
.LQQRFN¶VOHIW-wing roots helped him to initiate the modernisation of the Labour Party in the 
V¶$OGHUPDQDQG&DUWHUIndeed, sHYHQPRQWKVLQWR'XQFDQ6PLWK¶s tenure 
his defeated opponent for the leadership, Ken Clarke ± who during the contest had 
DFFXUDWHO\ODEHOOHGKLVRSSRQHQWµa hanger and a flogger¶± declared himsHOIµsurprised and 
delighted¶ E\ KLV SDUW\ OHDGHU¶V HIIRUWV WR PRYH WKH  &RQVHUYDWLYHV WR WKH FHQWUH JURXQG
particularly through his focus on poverty (Murphy, 2002).  
 
Although Duncan Smith won some unlikely plaudits ± he was also praised in late-2002 by 
Michael Portillo (2002) for resisting WKHµFRQVWDQWWHPSWDWLRQ¶RIDULJKW-wing populist agenda 
± the effort to renew the Conservative Party policy platform was far from unproblematic. One 
difficulty was that in spite of the greater persistence of Duncan Smith compared to his 
predecessor, notable inconsistencies remained across a range of policy issues. This reflected 
the continued absence of a coherent overall narrative to bind the (albeit still embryonic) 
Conservative programme together. This disjointed approach flowed from the leader himself, 
DV'XQFDQ6PLWKµRVFLOODWHG¶EHWZHHQDPRGHUQLVLQJDQGPRUHWUDGLWLRQDOLVWDSSURDFKLQSDUW
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simply in an effort to appease different elements within his own party (Bale, 2010: 159). The 
result was inconsistent signals to the electorate and the risk of appearing opportunistic. Some 
decisions, such as that to oppose the planned introduction of university top-up fees and the 
pledge to restore the earnings link to future rises in the state pension, prompted the latter fear 
even amongst some members of the shadow cabinet (Snowdon, 2010: 94).  
 
Behind many of these difficulties lay a strategic dilemma which Duncan Smith was far from 
resolving, namely how could the Conservatives balance their desire for lower taxes with the 
new dedication to public services? (Taylor, 2005: 144-153). This problem led to 
disagreement between the Conservative leader and his Shadow Chancellor, Michael Howard. 
To give credence to the public services narrative Howard wanted to reassure voters that the 
education and health budgets would be prioritised over tax cuts, by pledging to match 
/DERXU¶V VSHQGLQJSODQV (Snowdon, 2010: 94). This commitment was suddenly dropped in 
July 2002, as Duncan Smith caved-in to pressure from the right-wing press and the right of 
his parliamentary party. This effectively neutered Conservative efforts to gain ground from 
WKHJRYHUQPHQWRQWKHVHLVVXHVDVµDQ\FULWLFLVPWKH&RQVHUYDWLYHVPDGHRIWKHWZRVHUYLFHV
the public most cared about could easily be countered by asking them (endlessly but 
nonetheless effectively) how precisely they planned to improve those services by spending 
OHVV¶%DOH 
 
While some inchoate thinking by Duncan Smith undoubtedly contributed to this difficulty, 
had either Clarke or Portillo secured the Conservative leadership in 2001 they would have 
faced a similar dilemma over how to respond to the Blairite Labour hegemony. The context 
of a public perception of economic crisis and national decline, which had given Thatcherite 
solutions their electoral appeal, no longer applied. The Labour Party had successfully made 
WKH IXQGLQJDQG LPSURYHPHQWRISXEOLF VHUYLFHV WKHHOHFWRUDWH¶VNH\ concern, by accepting 
the free market in many areas but questioning the extent to which untrammelled market 
liberalism and privatisation could deliver them effectively. Even as market-based initiatives 
such as the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) have been spread throughout the public services, 
Labour successfully preserved the mass state provision of health and education services free 
at the point of delivery. In this sense, the major accomplishment and legacy of the Blair 
government was the fencing-off of a distinct public sector, and the apparent creation of a new 
consensus on the scope of the state in the early twenty-first century. Under Duncan Smith, 
like Hague before him, Conservative thinking on  
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policy continued to be framed firmly within Thatcherite ideological parameters, and 
consequently the party µHYROYHG QHLWKHU D FRQYLQFLQJ QDUUDWLYH QRU HIIHFWLYH VWDWHFUDIW¶ LQ
answer to this quandary (Taylor, 2005: 152). 
 
Party management 
 
'XQFDQ6PLWK¶V OHDGHUVKLSZDVSODJXHGE\SDUW\ PDQDJHPHQWSUREOHPVPDQ\RI ZKLFK D
more adroit leader might have sidestepped or diffused. His downfall after little more than two 
years in office ± which left the former Scots Guardsman with the ignominious honour of 
being the first Conservative Party leader since Neville Chamberlain not to take his party into 
a general election ± may have been avoided had he demonstrated a greater aptitude in this 
regard. Indeed, a key attraction WR 'XQFDQ 6PLWK¶V FROOHDgues of his successor Michael 
Howard ZDV WKH ODWWHU¶V UHSXWDWLRQ DV D ILUP GLVFLSOLQDULDQ ZKR ZRXOG EULQJ RUGHU WR WKH
parliamentary party.  6RPH RI 'XQFDQ 6PLWK¶V SDUW\ PDQDJHPHQW SUREOHPV XQGRXEWHGO\
derived from the fact that he was not the first choice leader of a majority of his parliamentary 
colleagues. Nonetheless, lacking the skill to make the best out of bad job, he contrived to 
make a difficult situation worse.  
 
One episode that served to illustrate both Duncan Smith¶VLQHSWLWXGHDVDSDUW\PDQDJHU and 
the problematic context he faced was the row that exploded over the ostensibly minor issue of 
WKHSDVVDJHRIWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V$GRSWLRn and Children Bill in November 2002. The House 
of Lords had amended the legislation to the effect that only married couples could adopt 
children, and the government sought to repeal these revisions in the Commons to grant 
unmarried and same-sex couples equal rights. For Labour and the Liberal Democrats, this 
was relatively uncontroversial (Dorey, 2004: 376). For the Conservatives however, it was 
much more contentious, exposing once again tensions in the party between social liberals and 
social traditionalists which had become a notable source of disagreement during the Hague 
years (Hayton, 2012: 102-118). 
 
The dilemma for the party was whether they should follow prominent modernisers such as 
Portillo in taking a liberal view and accepting these different forms of family life, or continue 
to advocate the primacy of marriage, which for the majority of Conservative MPs remained 
their preferred model for raising children. The easiest way out of this difficulty for Duncan 
Smith would have been to allow a free vote, but as a staunch social traditionalist himself he 
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instead chose to impose a three-line whip against the changes. The result was a public split 
DQG D OHDGHUVKLS FULVLV WKDW ZDV µDOPRVW HQWLUHO\ VHOI-LQIOLFWHG DQG HPLQHQWO\ DYRLGDEOH¶
(Cowley & Stuart, 2004: 357). Thirty-five Conservatives absented themselves from the 
Commons, and eight MPs defied the whip and voted against the party line. The eight 
included ex-leadership challengers Clarke and Portillo; four former Shadow Cabinet 
members (David Curry, Andrew Lansley, Andrew Mackay and Francis Maude); and most 
damagingly, John Bercow, who resigned from the Shadow Cabinet in order to rebel (Cowley 
& Stuart, 2004: 357). 7KLVPDUNHGDWXUQLQJSRLQWERWKIRU'XQFDQ6PLWK¶VOHDGHUVKLSDQGIRU
party management of sexual/moral political issues in the PCP. In terms of issue management, 
the lesson for the Conservatives was clear: the party was divided, and free votes on 
µFRQVFLHQFH¶LVVXHVRIIHUHGWKHPRVWHIIHFWLYHPHDQVWRSUHYHQW WKHPIURPDWWUDFWLQJPHGLD
interest and becoming public displays of disunity. Duncan Smith adopted this tactic when, in 
March 2003, the government once again brought forward legislation to repeal Section 28, and 
it was also used by Cameron and Howard.  
 
Underlying the gay adoption row was a more fundamental intraparty disagreement that 
GRJJHG 'XQFDQ 6PLWK¶V OHDGHUVKLS QDPHO\ WKH GHEDWH RYHU ZKHWKHU DQG KRZ WKH SDUW\
VKRXOGVHHNWRµPRGHUQLVH¶LQDQHIIRUWWRUHMXYHQDWHLWVLPDJHDQGEURDGHQLWVDSSHDO Back 
in 1998 The Times had argued that the key dividing line in the Conservative Party was no 
longer over Europe or between left and rLJKWEXW WKDWµWKHUHDOGLYLVLRQLVEHWZHHQOLEHUDOV
and reactionaries, modernisers and traditionalists, those armed primarily with principle and 
WKRVHZKRVHILUVWLQVWLQFWLVWRWDNHVKHOWHULQLQVWLWXWLRQV¶)XUWKHUPRUHIRUWKH&RQVHUYDWLYHV
WRUHJDLQSRZHUWKHµOLEHUDOVPXVWILUVWZLQWKHEDWWOHRILGHDVZLWKLQWKHLUSDUW\¶The Times, 
1998). The leader went on: 
 
The more important argument the Conservative Party still needs to have is between those 
sensitive to changing times and those inclined to nostalgia. It is a battle, we believe, between 
Tory Mods and Rockers. In the Sixties the former were those comfortable with change, the 
latter those who followed old fads. It is the difference between those with a gaze fixed on new 
horizons and those either blinkered or still dreaming. 
 
In other words, advocates of modernisation suggested that regardless of their personal 
preferences, electoral necessity demanded that Conservatives recognise the changing society 
in which they had to operate. The result of the 2001 leadership election, however, represented 
DFOHDUGHIHDWIRUµWKHPRGV¶± both  candidates presented to the party membership (Ken 
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&ODUNH DQG ,DLQ 'XQFDQ 6PLWK HVFKHZHG WKH µPRGHUQLVLQJ¶ ODEHO LWV FKLHI DGYRFDWH
(Portillo) having been eliminated by the final ballot of MPs.  
 
By his own admission Duncan Smith disliked the concept of modernisation, which he 
associated with a rejection of the core tenets of conservatism. In spite of this he did actively 
SXUVXHZKDWKHSUHIHUUHGWRFDOODµFKDQJH¶DJHQGD7KLVOHIWKLPLQWKHLOO-fated position of 
being attacked both by modernisers who were unconvinced by his efforts to change the party, 
and by traditionalists who felt that such moves went too far. Lacking a bedrock of support in 
the PCP Duncan Smith GLVSOD\HGµDQLQFUHDVLQJWHQGHQF\WRPDWFKHDFKPRGHUQL]LQJPRYH
ZLWKVRPHWKLQJIRU WKHWUDGLWLRQDOLVWV¶%DOH ± an approach destined to infuriate 
rather than placate both camps.  
 
Tim Bale offers a damning indictment of Duncan Smith¶V UHFRUG DW PDQDJLQJ KLV SDUW\
QRWLQJWKDWKHµpresided over a party that at times had descended into institutional chaos, a 
party that was unable to call on the services of many of its most talented individuals, a party 
WKDWWKDWHYHQWXDOO\ORVWWKHFRQILGHQFHRIWKHHFRQRPLFLQWHUHVWVWKDWIXQGHGLW¶%DOH
193). It is impossible to effectively defend Duncan Smith against any of these charges. Major 
donors deserted the Conservatives, making it clear that they would not reopen their 
chequebooks until a new leader was in place. Heavyweight figures such as Clarke, Portillo 
and Francis Maude refused to serve under him, but even from the limited pool of talent 
DYDLODEOH'XQFDQ6PLWK¶s shadow cabinet appointments drew disproportionally from the right 
RIWKHSDUW\)LQDOO\WKHOHDGHU¶VLQDELOLW\WRSUHYHQWRUFRQWDLQWKHdisunity and dissent that 
plagued the party was exacerbated by his own vacillations on strategy. To meet Duncan 
6PLWK¶V SURIHVVHG GHVLUH WR µFKDQJH¶ WKH &RQVHUYDWLYH 3DUW\ UHTXLUHG D OHDGHU ZLWK D PRUH
coherent approach pursued with greater resolve than he was able to muster.  
 
Emotional intelligence  
 
Political scientists tend to downplay the significance of personality in politics, preferring 
instead institutional, structural or ideological explanations. Politicians themselves often 
denigrate the media for its seemingly ceaseless interest in the character of political figures ± 
which allegedly comes at the expense of an adequate focus on policy or ideas. Yet the 
individual personalities of political leaders often play a crucial role in political outcomes: 
different characters shape events in quite different ways. Even in the case of perhaps the most 
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imposing figure in post-ZDU %ULWLVK SROLWLFV 0DUJDUHW 7KDWFKHU µSROLWLFDO VFLHQWLVWV KDYH
lavished attention on Thatcherism and its impact, but they have not written much about the 
ZRPDQKHUVHOI¶*DUQHWW,QWKHFDVHRI'XQFDQ6PLWK elite interviews and insider 
accounts his tenure lead to the unavoidable conclusion that concerns over his individual 
character, aptitude and personality were at WKH IRUHIURQW RI KLV SDUOLDPHQWDU\ FROOHDJXHV¶
minds when they removed him from office.2 Indeed for some, these doubts were firmly in 
WKHLUPLQGVGXULQJKLVOHDGHUVKLSHOHFWLRQFDPSDLJQ$V%DOHGLSORPDWLFDOO\QRWHGµ'XQFDQ
6PLWK¶VELJJHVWSUREOHPZDVWKDt he was not renowned among his colleagues for being the 
VKDUSHVWNQLIHLQWKHGUDZ¶The perception that he was not up to the job dogged 
his leadership, and Duncan Smith did little to dispel it with his poor handling of various 
crises that he faced.  
 
The previous section discussed how Duncan Smith induced a severe party management 
difficulty for himself through his decision to impose a three-line whip on what many regarded 
as a vote of conscience. Duncan Smith interpreted this rebellion as a conspiracy designed to 
destabilise his leadership, and compounded his initial error by seeking to reassert his 
authority through a crackdown on the dissenters. The next day he made a statement on the 
steps of Conservative Central Office calling for the part\WRµXQLWHRUGLH¶,QLWKHdeclared 
WKDW KH KDG µEHJXQ WR UHFRQQHFW WKH Conservative Party with the views and attitudes of 
FRQWHPSRUDU\%ULWDLQ¶ ± an odd claim given that many in his own party were concerned that 
his position on gay adoption was out of touch with modern Britain. Equally, he asserted that 
KHZDVOHDGLQJWKHSDUW\ZLWKXQLW\LQPLQGµUHVSHFWLQJWKRVHZKRZRXOGOLNHPHWRPRYH
IDVWHUDQGWKRVHZKRIHHOWKUHDWHQHGE\RXUPRYLQJDWDOO¶+RZHYHU 
 
Over the last few weeks a small group of my parliamentary colleagues have decided 
consciously to undermine my leadership. For a few, last night's vote was not about adoption 
but an attempt to challenge my mandate to lead this party. We cannot go on in this fashion. 
We have to pull together or we will hang apart.  
 
The fact that Duncan Smith even felt the need to make an extraordinary appeal to the party 
barely a year into his leadership illustrated the perilous nature of his position, and it was 
strongly rumoured that he was on the brink of resignation (Brogan & Helm, 2002). The 
normally sympathetic Daily Telegraph GHVFULEHGLWDVµWKHPRVWGHVSHUDWHGD\LQWKHKLVWRU\
RI WKH &RQVHUYDWLYH 3DUW\¶ <RXQJ  .HQQHWK &ODUNH DWWDFNHG WKH SDUW\ OHDGHU¶V
                                                 
2
 See Bale (2010: 134-193); Hayton (2008); Hayton & Heppell (2010); and Snowdon (2010: 75-119).  
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KDQGOLQJ RI WKH µHQWLUHO\ VHOI-LQGXFHG¶ FULVLV -RQHV et al., 2002), and within days a 
YouGov/Telegraph opinion poll revealed that 52 percent of Conservative voters thought that 
the election of Duncan Smith had been a mistake. Moreover, 81 percent of supporters and 75 
percent of party members thought he had mishandled the adoption issue by failing to allow 
MPs a free vote (Helm and Sylvester, 2002).  
 
'XQFDQ 6PLWK¶V KDQGOLQJ RI WKLV FULVLV is an interesting case-study in how he struggled to 
FRSHZLWK WKHSUHVVXUHVRI OHDGHUVKLS)RU6QRZGRQ LWZDV DIWHU WKLV µGHVSHUDWH appeal for 
XQLW\¶WKDWµWKH6KDGRZ&DELQHW ORVWDOOKRSH¶5LFN1\HZKRZDVKHDGRIWKH
Conservative Research Department at the time, noted that: µthe more pressure he was under, 
the more nervous he got and the more desperate he was to show he ZDVLQFRQWURO¶quoted in 
6QRZGRQ   $V 'XQFDQ 6PLWK¶V LQVHFXULWLHV JUHZ, his judgement diminished. 
Increasingly mistrustful of those around him, a few months later he sacked Nye; party chief 
executive Mark McGregor; and director of field operations Stephen Gilbert from Central 
Office. This purge smacked of desperation and panic, and worse was to follow. The leader¶V
choice of replacement for McGregor, former Maastricht rebel Barry Legg, reflected his 
increasing tendency to assign key posts to friends and close allies rather than to the best 
TXDOLILHG FDQGLGDWHV DYDLODEOH +LV GHFLVLRQ WR DQQRXQFH /HJJ¶V DSSRLQWPHQW ZLWKRXW HYHQ
consulting the Party Board (which was technically responsible for it as Legg would be a party 
HPSOR\HH SURYRNHG IXU\ DQG µULVNHG DOLHQDWLQJ WKH FRQVWLWXHQF\ UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV ZKRVH
presumed loyalty was one of the main reasons why Tory MPs (who were also worried about 
appearing to stab him in the back while the country was at war) were staying their hands 
EHIRUHWKHORFDOHOHFWLRQV¶%DOH/HJJODVWHG less than three months in the role 
before being forced out, and Duncan Smith was also forced to back down over the removal of 
*LOEHUW ZKR ZDV µUHLQVWDWHG IROORZLQJ SURWHVWV IURP WKH ERDUG¶ 6QRZGRQ   ,Q
attempting to crush dissent and shore-XS KLV RZQ SRVLWLRQ 'XQFDQ 6PLWK¶V seemingly 
irrational decisions only served to further undermine it. His leadership style was a bizarre mix 
of a consensual balancing act on one hand, as he tried to please both modernisers and 
traditionalists at the expense of sticking to a clear agenda of his own; interspersed with 
dictatorial snaps which ultimately only served to highlight his lack of authority.  
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Conclusion  
 
For any leader of the opposition the key test is the electoral one: can they return their party to 
power? Unable to convince his parliamentary colleagues that they had any hope of victory 
under his leadership, Duncan Smith was denied the opportunity to take his party into a 
general election, removed by a vote of no confidence in October 2003. This represented an 
ignominious failure on his part, and history will necessarily judge him harshly as a leader 
lacking authority in his own party, let alone in the country. Yet if he did not sow the seeds of 
electoral recovery he did at least begin to till the land, making a serious attempt to begin the 
process of policy renewal ± work that he would continue out of office through the 
establishment of a think-tank, the Centre for Social Justice.  
 
A poor public communicator and disastrous party manager, Duncan Smith unable to persuade 
either his shadow cabinet or the parliamentary party of the virtues of his reorientation 
strategy. He was undermined by a lack of legitimacy, having secured the support of less than 
one third of his parliamentary colleagues in the 2001 leadership election. Duncan Smith had 
VRPH VXFFHVV VKLIWLQJ WKH &RQVHUYDWLYHV¶ IRFXV DZD\ IURP core vote issues, although even 
this effort was undermined by wavering by the leader himself. His handling of the question of 
adoption rights for gay couples was a cataclysmic failure of party management, and became 
symbolic of the wider sense of his failure as leader. His tactical ineptitude brutally exposed 
ideological divisions and led directly to the end of his leadership. Despite his efforts to widen 
HOHFWRUDO DSSHDO E\ GHYHORSLQJ WKH SDUW\¶V SROLFLHV RQ SXEOLF VHUYLFHV DQG VRFLDO MXVWLFH
Duncan Smith was unable to gain support from the modernisers while precisely those efforts 
weakened his support amongst traditionalists. Encumbered by his own rebellious past, he 
could not inspire the confidence or loyalty of his colleagues. In short, Duncan Smith failed 
the most basic test of political leaders, namely the need to establish and maintain his 
authority. The manner of his election granted him little authority in the PCP, and he proved 
unable to establish it through charisma, political skill or through the exercise of his office. 
Without authority his leadership was doomed.  
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